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European disintegration: a new feature of EU politics 
Lucas Schramm
In recent years, the European Union (EU) has been facing a 
large number of crises – from the Eurozone crisis to the 
Schengen and Brexit crises, to a rule-of-law crisis in several 
member states. Some scholars have argued that the EU is 
undergoing the most difficult period of its existence due to 
the longevity and severity of this ‘multiple crisis’ (e.g. 
Schimmelfennig 2017). In the context of the controversies 
about these crises, the concept of ‘European disintegration’ 
has gained particular attention in EU studies and political 
debates. It seems that crises and disintegration are linked 
in such a way that a crisis often precedes and eventually 
triggers disintegration. Until now, however, a theory of Eu-
ropean disintegration remains lacking. Even more problem-
atic is that only few scholars operate with an explicit defini-
tion of disintegration. 
This policy brief systematically reviews and assesses the re-
cent and mainly academic literature on European disinte-
gration, providing an overview of the major findings on this 
novel subject. It starts by outlining why the phenomenon of 
European disintegration has recently caught so much atten-
tion, and it discusses what European disintegration implies. 
It then points to manifestations of disintegration and pre-
sents possible drivers of and barriers to European disinte-
gration before arguing that a more reflective use of ‘differ-
entiated integration’ may be a way forward for pro-Euro-
pean integration policy-makers to regain control of the po-
litical process. 
European disintegration: why does it matter? 
Since the beginning of the European integration project, 
scholars have offered theoretical arguments for why and how 
European integration occurs. One could argue that theories 
claiming to explain regional integration should also be able to 
account for regional disintegration. To date, this is however 
not the case. 
From an empirical point of view, various scholars have argued 
that we see manifestations of a European disintegration in 
several policy fields nowadays (see below). If they agree on 
the emergence of such a new empirical phenomenon, they 
should also have the ambition to conceptualize and theorize 
it. So far, European integration has been regarded as a unidi-
rectional process (Webber 2019: 2), characterized by a con-
tinuous increase both in the number of member states and 
the EU’s authority over policy fields (Genschel and Jachten-
fuchs 2014: 16). Disintegration, if detectable, would thus be 
a new feature of the integration process and a new object for 
EU studies. 
Several scholars have therefore recently tried to turn estab-
lished theories of International Relations and European inte-
gration on their head and asked when and how the EU disin-
tegrates. In doing so, they investigated if and how concepts 
used by existing theories – seeking to explain European inte-
gration – might also help to account for European disintegra-
tion. However, as Webber (2019: 22-34) notes, the existing 
frameworks are unable to explain the different levels of dis-
integration in some of the EU’s most recent crises (Eurozone, 
Ukraine, Schengen and Brexit crises). 
 
Executive Summary 
> In the past few years, and particularly in the con-
text of a number of crises shaking the founda-
tions of the European Union, the number of aca-
demic publications and political debates on Euro-
pean ‘disintegration’ has grown considerably. 
However, a standard definition, let alone a the-
ory, of ‘disintegration’ is still lacking. 
> Among the most obvious manifestations of disin-
tegration were several crisis-affected policy 
fields. Whilst disintegration ultimately hardly un-
folded during the Eurozone crisis, the Schengen 
crisis displayed considerable disintegrative fea-
tures. Brexit, however, can be regarded as the 
clearest sign of European disintegration. 
> Disintegration entails high political risks and 
poses a threat to the overall process of European 
integration, as it contains many unknown and po-
tentially uncontrollable dynamics. Pro-European 
integration policy-makers should therefore try to 
regain control over the political process, for in-
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Towards a definition of European disintegration 
Put simply, European disintegration can be seen as the re-
verse process of European integration. It has been argued 
that European integration takes place in three different 
forms (Schimmelfennig 2017; Webber 2019: 13f.): first, 
deepening is when policy competences are transferred 
from the national to the European level; second, broaden-
ing depicts EU competence gains in new policy fields; and 
third, widening is when the number of EU member states 
increases through enlargement. This conceptualization fol-
lows a political-institutional understanding of European in-
tegration, which to date has dominated EU scholarship. It 
differs from broader understandings of European integra-
tion, which also include economic and societal factors that 
are more challenging to clearly ‘measure’. 
The political-institutional understanding allows for both Eu-
ropean integration and disintegration to be considered as 
multi-dimensional and two-directional phenomena. De-
fined in this way, political disintegration takes place when 
supranational EU institutions (e.g., the European Commis-
sion, European Court of Justice, European Central Bank) 
lose power or authority, when formerly common policy 
fields are renationalized, and/or when a member state 
withdraws from the EU (Webber 2019: 14). At the same 
time, European integration/disintegration becomes a con-
tinuous rather than a dichotomous concept, placed on a 
continuum with two extreme ends: full-scale integration at 
the one end and full-scale disintegration at the other end 
(Börzel 2018: 478). Others have argued that disintegration 
is best understood as a process rather than an outcome 
(Vollaard 2018: 1). This, however, makes it difficult to es-
tablish a benchmark for the actual materialization of disin-
tegration. 
In the light of these remarks, I suggest applying a rather sim-
ple definition of European disintegration, which is guided 
by the political-institutional understanding of European in-
tegration. European disintegration involves the reverse pro-
cess of at least one of the three dimensions of European in-
tegration (deepening, broadening, widening). This concep-
tualization allows thinking of European integration/disinte-
gration as a multi-dimensional and two-directional process. 
Moreover, it conceptualizes European integration and dis-
integration as continuous – not dichotomous, mutually ex-
clusive – phenomena. For comparative reasons, it is im-
portant that European integration/disintegration are meas-
ured with the help of the same indicators. Lastly, and again 
with regards to measurability, integration/disintegration 
should be thought of as outcomes rather than ongoing pro-
cesses. 
European disintegration: manifestations, drivers, barriers 
In the following paragraphs, I illustrate manifestations of 
European disintegration by referring to recent develop-
ments in different policy fields. I also point out drivers of 
and barriers to disintegration, which help explain why it oc-
curs in some, but not in other policy fields. The examples all 
form part of the EU’s ‘multiple crisis’. 
Eurozone crisis 
The Eurozone crisis (2009-2015) threatened the existence 
of the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). While 
some policy-makers demanded the exclusion of certain 
member states (notably Greece), others called for their 
own country (e.g., Germany) to leave the Eurozone. Some 
scholars argued that a disintegration of the Eurozone would 
contain significant benefits, especially the restoration of na-
tional macro-economic control. 
At the same time, a disintegration of the Eurozone was 
widely seen as economically and politically highly costly. In 
addition, the member states most affected by the crisis – 
‘the South’ – depended on the fiscal support of the richer 
member states – ‘the North’ – and were ultimately willing 
to agree on and to undergo structural adjustment pro-
grammes. More importantly, however, the Eurozone had a 
powerful supranational institution – in the form of the Eu-
ropean Central Bank –, which through its monetary policy 
facilitated the refinancing of member states and the bail-
out of important national banks. In the end, notably the 
supposedly extremely high costs and a powerful suprana-
tional institution were thus significant barriers to a disinte-
gration of the EMU. 
Schengen crisis 
In the mid-2010s, a high influx of refugees and migrants into 
the EU posed threats to the Schengen ‘no border’ area. The 
resulting Schengen crisis (2015-2016) led to a partial break-
down of the Common European Asylum System in such a 
way that the Dublin rules – which determine the member 
state responsible for the assessment of an asylum applica-
tion – were ignored by several member states at the EU’s 
external borders, such as Greece, Italy and Hungary. The 
Schengen area also witnessed the reintroduction of con-
trols at some of its internal borders. Finally, some member 
states openly opposed European law by refusing to accept 
the legally binding EU-wide relocation of refugees. 
Compared to the Eurozone crisis, there was no powerful su-
pranational institution that could have facilitated or just 
‘bought time’ for policy compromises. More importantly, 
the burdens in terms of arriving refugees and migrants 
were divided very unequally among member states: 
Whereas the few countries receiving the largest share 
asked for more burden-sharing, most member states were 
hardly affected at all and had little incentives to contribute 
to EU-wide solutions. As a result, asylum and internal secu-
rity policies in the EU have been to a significant extent re-
nationalized, while EU institutions – namely the Commis-
sion and the Court of Justice – have partially lost authority. 
Although the Schengen area has also witnessed some minor 
steps of further integration – e.g., a rise in staff of Frontex, 
the EU border and coast guard agency –, altogether, this 
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crisis has led to a partial disintegration of the Schengen area 
both in terms of level (‘deepening’) and scope (‘broaden-
ing’). 
Brexit 
The third crisis relates to a member state desirous to with-
draw from EU membership and hence affects the ‘widen-
ing’ dimension of European political integration. It was trig-
gered by a national referendum in June 2016, where a ma-
jority of British people voted for ‘Leave’. Brexit has not only 
led to a domestic political crisis in the United Kingdom, but 
also constitutes a crisis of European integration: if eventu-
ally implemented, Brexit would be a clear manifestation of 
European disintegration. 
However, the ultimate outcome of the Brexit crisis is un-
clear. The procedural difficulties which the British govern-
ment has been experiencing during the negotiations illus-
trate how complex (and costly) it is to withdraw from EU 
membership. This points to the status-quo bias in European 
integration, which has repeatedly been highlighted by EU 
scholars and which might prevent the EU from (fully) disin-
tegrating. Indeed, it is more difficult to properly dissolve or 
fundamentally restructure an organization, institution or 
policy regime than to establish it in the first place. 
This short examination of the EU’s main recent crises high-
lights three points: First, disintegration can be both a tem-
porary and a permanent phenomenon: if the reintroduction 
of national border controls within the Schengen area is re-
versed again in the near future, this would be an example 
for the former; if, conversely, the Brexit negotiations ulti-
mately lead to the United Kingdom fully withdrawing from 
EU membership, this would illustrate the latter. Second, 
disintegration and integration can happen at the same 
time: whereas the reintroduction of national border con-
trols stand for the former, the upgrade of Frontex is a sign 
of the latter. Third, as the comparison between the Euro-
zone crisis and the Schengen crisis illustrates, the distribu-
tion of burdens and relevant power resources among mem-
ber states as well as the potential costs of a partial or fully 
dissolution of the respective policy regime determine the 
likelihood of disintegration. 
Differentiated integration as a counter-strategy to disinte-
gration? 
Another important concept that has caught considerable 
attention in recent years is that of differentiated integra-
tion (Schimmelfennig et al. 2015). It refers to cases in which 
not all EU member states participate in a certain policy field 
(‘horizontal’ differentiation) or to policy fields that are inte-
grated to different levels of centralization (‘vertical’ differ-
entiation). Examples are the Eurozone, the Schengen area, 
and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. 
Interestingly, the European Commission’s 2017 White Pa-
per on the Future of Europe lists five scenarios, two of 
which entail proposals including differentiated integration. 
More specifically, in scenario 3 (‘Those who want more do 
more’) some willing member states emerge to work to-
gether in specific policy fields like defence or taxation (Eu-
ropean Commission 2017: 20). In scenario 4 (‘Doing less 
more efficiently’), conversely, the EU for some policies is 
given stronger tools to implement and enforce common de-
cisions (ibid.: 22). 
For pro-European integration policy-makers – both at the EU 
and the national levels –, (actively) pursuing differentiated in-
tegration instead of (passively) fighting off disintegration 
might be a way to remain in, or regain, control of the political 
process. Differentiated integration, as opposed to disintegra-
tion, is a concept with a more positive connotation, among 
both the electorate and the academic community. Advocates 
of further European integration could use the potential (and 
threat) of moving on with differentiated integration in order 
to circumvent certain obstacles, e.g., EU-sceptical govern-
ments in some member states. Differentiated integration, 
thus, might allow policy-makers to frame European integra-
tion again in more positive and pragmatic ways.  
Three policy fields appear particularly suited for such initia-
tives: First, a ‘core’ of EU member states – notably France and 
Germany, the Benelux and Scandinavian countries – could 
seek to link the rule-of-law problems in some member states 
(Hungary, Poland, Romania) to EU-wide redistribution instru-
ments, e.g., the regional and cohesion funds in the EU’s next 
multiannual financial framework. Irrespective of the possible 
legal barriers of such a linkage, this core of member states 
can in this way remind their peers that EU membership goes 
along with certain non-negotiable rules and obligations. The 
systematic undermining of the independence of the judiciary 
and the media represents an attack on essential EU principles 
and a partial disintegration of the EU’s acquis communau-
taire. As the countries concerned depend heavily on EU finan-
cial means, a number of member states could establish new 
forms of redistribution that would only be available to a circle 
of countries fulfilling certain criteria. 
Second, the Schengen crisis has led to a disintegration of the 
Common European Asylum System and to a re-establishment 
of national border controls inside the Schengen area. The ma-
jor problem remains that the EU’s external borders are not 
adequately secured and that EU law – notably the Dublin 
rules – is not fully applied. Recently, French President Macron 
has suggested to create a fully functional ‘mini-Schengen’. 
The prospect (and threat) of restoring the free travelling of 
citizens only within a smaller number of countries could in-
centivise reluctant member states to agree on greater bur-
den-sharing efforts and on new competences for EU institu-
tions. 
Third, the EU’s most powerful countries – Germany and 
France – should revitalize initiatives which have almost fallen 
into oblivion during recent years, such as a European-wide fi-
nancial transaction tax. An aggressive tax competition be-
tween EU member states threatens the proper functioning of 
the single market and contains disintegrative risks, notably in 
a highly institutionalized and interdependent policy regime 
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like the Eurozone. Furthermore, such a European tax would 
provide important re-distributional means at the EU level, 
whose spending then could help preventing disintegrative 
tendencies inside the Eurozone and other policy regimes 
from unfolding. 
In order for differentiated integration to replace at least 
partly the prospect of (uncontrolled) disintegration, there is 
a need for EU institutions to commonly identify the major 
risks to the European integration process and to agree on ad-
equate measures to tackle those risks. The new terms of the 
Commission, the Parliament and the European Council Presi-
dent provide the opportunity for such an evaluation.  
The idea (and threat) of establishing a fully working ‘mini-
Schengen’ may have the biggest potential for a new form of 
differentiated integration, which might then also have disci-
plinary effects on so-far reluctant member states. At the 
same time, it will be important that countries at the core of 
differentiated integration make sure that member states in 
the EU’s periphery which are willing and able to participate in 
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